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In modern work environments, it can be difficult for workers to avoid becoming
distracted from their current task. This study investigates person–situation interactions
to predict thought control activities (kind of self-control), which aim to stop distracting
thoughts that enter the mind. Specifically, it was examined (1) how challenging work
demands (time pressure, task complexity) activate workers’ thought control to stop
distractive thoughts (nlevel2 = 143) and relate to the effort to do so (nlevel2 = 91) in
daily working life and (2) how these relationships differ according workers’ general
cognitive ability to suppress unwanted thoughts. To understand these person–situation
interactions, an experience sampling study was combined with a laboratory task
assessing the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts (think/no-think task). Multilevel
modeling revealed that workers’ engage more often and more intensively in thought
control activities at a moderate level of time pressure but only when they had a
higher general ability to suppress unwanted thoughts. For workers with a lower ability
to suppress unwanted thoughts, increasing time pressure was negatively related to
thought control activities, even at very low levels of time pressure. Thus, whether time
pressure activates or hinders thought control depends on individuals’ ability to suppress
distractive thoughts.
Keywords: suppression-induced forgetting, thought control, self-control, time pressure, experience sampling
INTRODUCTION
Struggling with distracting thoughts while attempting to focus on an important task is a frustrating
or even stressful everyday experience at work. More than 86% of the adults in the United States
reported to be constantly distracted by electronic devices, which was associated with higher stress
levels (American Psychological Association, 2017). Up to 50% of an individual’s daily thoughts are
not related to the ongoing task (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Surrounded by large amounts
of digitalized information, and with multiple projects and tasks, workers’ performance increasingly
depends on the exertion of thought control, specifically on stopping distracting thoughts that would
otherwise interfere with successful task accomplishment (Schmidt and Neubach, 2007; Dabbish
et al., 2011; Randall et al., 2014).
Although stopping distracting thoughts can be very difficult at times, research on self-control
(e.g., Tangney et al., 2004; Schmeichel, 2007) and on motivated forgetting (Bjork et al., 1998;
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Anderson and Green, 2001; Anderson and Hanslmayr, 2014)
has shown that individuals are capable of suppressing such
undesired impulses and behaviors and that they are even
able to deliberately limit access to information in memory
that is emotionally distressing, unwanted, or irrelevant to task
processing. Successfully stopping these unwanted thoughts and
impulses can have several immediate positive consequences such
as a better mood, more concentration to the task at hand, more
learning, and better performance (Kanfer and Heggestad, 1999;
Nørby, 2015).
However, it has also been consistently shown that the ability
to inhibit unwanted and distracting memory contents differs
across individuals (e.g., Levy and Anderson, 2008; Miyake and
Friedman, 2012; Tangney et al., 2004) and can be compromised
by situational factors (e.g., a concurrent task, Schmeichel, 2007).
To explain these variations, studies have primarily focused on
the underlying executive control processes (e.g., Anderson and
Green, 2001; Anderson and Huddleston, 2012; Anderson and
Hanslmayr, 2014) or on capacity issues such as resource depletion
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; Kotabe and Hofmann, 2015; Lian
et al., 2017). In contrast to research on failed control, there
is surprisingly little known about the activation of self-control
processes (Kotabe and Hofmann, 2015; Lian et al., 2017).
In the present study, we investigated the deliberate and
conscious activation of self-control processes. We focused on
the activation of one specific self-control strategy, namely, on
thought control that aims at limiting access to distractive memory
contents to protect purposeful, goal-directed behavior. Building
on previous research, we proposed that the activation of thought
control in a given situation is not only a function of individuals’
ability to suppress unwanted thoughts (dispositional aspect)
but also of situational demands, which foster or hinder the
engagement in (state) thought control. It is important to note
that we investigated both the ability to suppress unwanted
thoughts (dispositional aspect) as a predictor and moderator
variable and the momentary activation of thought control as an
outcome variable.
We combined a laboratory task assessing workers’ ability to
suppress unwanted thoughts, the think/no-think task (Anderson
and Green, 2001), with an experience sampling study to examine
how challenging work demands foster or hinder stopping
distractive thoughts (i.e., state thought control) in daily working
life. Specifically, we investigated two prominent challenging
demands at work (Cavanaugh et al., 2000; LePine et al., 2005):
time pressure (i.e., a high amount of work must be completed in
little time; Spector and Jex, 1998) and task complexity (i.e., a high
number of task elements and their relationships; Maynard and
Hakel, 1997). Figure 1 shows the proposed relationships between
the study’s variables.
The study contributes to the literature on self-control
processes at work in the following ways. First, previous research
on self-control has mainly concentrated on depleted self-control
capacity as primary source of failed impulse and behavioral
control (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994). As this is only one aspect of
the self-control process (Kotabe and Hofmann, 2015; Lian et al.,
2017), we also emphasize the deliberate activation of thought
control as one self-control strategy in a naturalistic setting.
Second, by combining a laboratory study with experience
sampling, we were able to examine person–situation interactions,
specifically, how the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
helps to keep distractive thoughts at bay in different situations
in daily working life. In line with stress research, individuals’
ability to suppress unwanted thoughts can be seen as a
personal resource, which can protect against the adverse effects
of challenging situational demands (Hobfoll, 2002; Schmidt
and Neubach, 2007). We add to this research, first, by
investigating a specific ability (inhibition) rather than broader
concepts such as self-control that comprises both the efforts
to stimulate desirable responses and to inhibit unwanted
responses (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 2004).
Second, we measured the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
with a theoretically grounded, rigorous experimental task, the
think/no-think paradigm (e.g., Anderson and Green, 2001)
that allows us to overcome measurement limitations related
to self-report (e.g., measure of self-control, Tangney et al.,
2004; measure of thought control, Wells and Davies, 1994)
often used in applied research. Finally, the intraindividual
design allowed us to examine the links between challenge




The phenomenon of stopping distractive thoughts has been
studied in different psychological subdisciplines, using different
terms (Hofmann et al., 2012) such as memory control
and intentional forgetting (cognitive psychology), self-control,
and self-regulation (social psychology). There is considerable
evidence that, in organizational settings, successful (state) self-
control promotes a broad range of positive employee responses
(e.g., Lian et al., 2017).
In the present study, we focus on thought control activities
that aim at limiting access to distractive memory contents,
thus stop distractive thoughts, to protect purposeful, goal-
directed behavior.
There is considerable evidence that thought control activities
such as stopping unwanted thoughts relies on inhibition (Conway
et al., 2000; Mecklinger et al., 2009; Román et al., 2009;
Anderson and Huddleston, 2012; Benoit et al., 2015), an
essential process of executive control (see also Miyake et al.,
2000; von Hippel and Gonsalkorale, 2005; Schmeichel, 2007;
Miyake and Friedman, 2012). As the capacity of executive
control is limited (Schmeichel, 2007; Levy and Anderson, 2008),
competing tasks that require effort and attention (Ward and
Mann, 2000; Lavie et al., 2004) or a previous task that require
control capacity (Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Schmeichel,
2007) can temporarily impair executive control with negative
consequences for the suppression of unwanted thoughts (e.g.,
Schmeichel, 2007; Román et al., 2009; Ortega et al., 2012; Noreen
and de Fockert, 2017). For example, Noreen and de Fockert
(2017) have found that suppression of memories, assessed with
the think/no-think task (Anderson and Green, 2001), suffered
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FIGURE 1 | Relationships between the study’s variables.
when participants simultaneously performed a high working
memory load task. Thus, based on this research, situational
demands involving heightened information processing and
executive contdrol resources such as high time pressure and
task complexity should make thought control activities less
successful, and more difficult. Consequently, one would predict
that with increasing time pressure and task complexity, workers
activate thought control activities less likely, and if they do, they
have to try harder.
In contrast, another line of research has revealed meta-
analytic evidence that challenging situations at work (e.g., time
pressure) are positively associated with performance, a result that
is explained by motivational processes (LePine et al., 2004, 2005).
As challenging demands are perceived as positive and changeable,
individuals mobilize more effort to perform their tasks (LePine
et al., 2005). This is in line with Hockey (1997) supposition that
stress can increase effort and concentration on dealing with the
tasks at hand. Supporting this notion, Rodell and Judge (2009)
and Kane et al. (2007) showed in diary studies that persons paid
more attention to challenging demands at work.
However, not all studies found a linear relationship between
challenge demands and a range of employee responses; a few
studies have also found an inverted U-shaped relationship
(e.g., Baer and Oldham, 2006; Hofmans et al., 2015):
Challenge demands increase performance but only up
to a point. Researchers often draw on activation theory
(Gardner, 1986; Gardner and Cummings, 1988) to explain this
curvilinear relationship. Activation increases with increasing
challenge demands, with positive consequences for cognitive
and behavioral responses. At moderate levels of activation,
individuals are optimally stimulated and increase their effort,
which results in better use of cognitive resources, performance,
less negative affect, and an increase in positive affect. Too little
or too much activation result in less positive responses. In
line with this reasoning, we assume that when working under
little time pressure or accomplishing a simple task, workers
may have enough cognitive capacity to think about unwanted,
task-irrelevant issues while still performing well. Activation of
thought control is not necessary here. Alternatively, workers
might feel understimulated and thus too passive to counteract
their distractive thoughts by suppressing them or even welcome
distractions from a rather boring task.
As time pressure and task complexity increase, it becomes
more difficult to stay focused, and therefore, workers need
to increase the number of attempts to suppress irrelevant or
unwanted thoughts (i.e., to engage in thought control) and
the effort to stop distractive thoughts. After a certain point,
however, the high working memory load resulting from high
time pressure or task complexity may compete for cognitive
control resources with memory suppression, leading to an
overtaxing of this resource, with potential costs in terms
of performance decrements. Consequently, attempts to stop
distractive thoughts will decrease. Thus, after a certain point, the
cost of activating thought control might outweigh its benefits
for staying focused and performing well (Botvinick and Braver,
2015). Based on these theoretical considerations we hypothesize
the following:
Hypothesis 1: Within-person variations in time pressure
during daily work should relate curvilinearly to within-person
variations in (a) the likelihood to activate thought control to
stop distracting thoughts and (b) the effort that is mobilized
to stop distracting thoughts in an inverted u-shaped way.
Hypothesis 2: Within-person variations in task complexity
during daily work should relate curvilinearly to within-person
variations in (a) the likelihood to activate thought control to
stop distracting thoughts and (b) the effort that is mobilized
to stop distracting thoughts in an inverted u-shaped way.
ABILITY TO SUPPRESS UNWANTED
THOUGHTS
As the points at which challenge demands motivate or hinder
individuals’ thought control seems to depend on dispositional
cognitive resources, we also investigated interindividual
differences in the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
(Levy and Anderson, 2008). The executive deficit hypothesis
(Levy and Anderson, 2008) proposes that differences in the
ability to suppress unwanted thoughts stem, in part, from
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differences in executive control abilities such as inhibition
that has been supported by neurocognitive (e.g., Anderson,
2004; Anderson and Huddleston, 2012) and behavioral
studies (e.g., Levy and Anderson, 2008). Executive control
processes such as inhibition are necessary for purposeful,
intelligent thinking and acting (Kane and Engle, 2002; Levy
and Anderson, 2008), and are related to working memory
capacity (Delaney and Sahakyan, 2007; Aslan et al., 2010;
Fawcett and Taylor, 2012).
We assume that workers with a higher ability to suppress
distractive thoughts might have more cognitive capacity to
activate thought control in a given situation and, consequently,
do not have to put much effort in the attempt to exert thought
control. Thus, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 3: The ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
should relate positively to (a) the likelihood to activate thought
control to stop distracting thoughts and (b) negatively to the
effort that is mobilized to stop distracting thoughts.
We assumed that individuals who are able to suppress
distractive thoughts will be less vulnerable to high challenge
demands as compared to individuals with lower abilities.
Thus, they have enough executive control resources left to
activate thought control even under high time pressure or
while performing a highly complex task. Therefore, we predict
the following:
Hypothesis 4: The ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
should moderate the curvilinear relationship between time
pressure and (a) the likelihood to activate thought control to
stop distracting thoughts and (b) the effort that is mobilized
to stop distracting thoughts in such a way that the inflection
point after which the relationship turns negative occurs on
higher levels of time pressure when the ability to forget is high
compared to a low ability to forget.
Hypothesis 5: The ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
should moderate the curvilinear relationship between task
complexity and (a) the likelihood to activate thought control
to stop distracting thoughts and (b) the effort that is mobilized
to stop distracting thoughts in such a way that the inflection
point after which the relationship turns negative occurs on
higher levels of task complexity when the ability to forget is
high compared to a low ability to forget.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample
Following the recommendations of Simmons et al. (2011),
we have determined a sample size of 150 persons prior to
data collection due to practical reasons. The study was time
consuming for the participants: Workers were asked to respond
to a general questionnaire, to participate in the think-no think
task (TNT task) in the laboratory, which lasted 2.5 h, and finally
to participate in an experience sampling study (three times on
five working days).
To recruit participants, we distributed study information via
professional online networks, social media (e.g., xing.com), and
flyer in public organizations (e.g., libraries) and in companies.
One hundred sixty-seven workers agreed to participate. One
hundred sixty-four workers came to our laboratory, and 162
workers finished the think/no-think task successfully. During
the experience sampling week, 158 workers completed at
least two questionnaires, of whom 143 reported distractive
thoughts at least once, and 124 twice or more. As it was
difficult to predict how many questionnaires a participant
would respond to, our last recruitment initiative yielded seven
participants less than sought. Participants received EUR 50 for
their participation.
In the final sample of 158 workers (57% female), individuals
were between 18 and 71 years old (M = 36.56 years,
SD = 12.27 years). They worked in different industries, primarily
performed office jobs, and worked 40.57 h/week on average
(SD = 7.79 h). They were all able to speak German at a native
speaker level and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
During the experience sampling, the participants completed a
total of 1,565 questionnaires (M = 9.91, SD = 3.16; range,
2–15). In the following analyses, sample sizes vary according
to the outcome variable (n = 158 for distractive thoughts,
n = 143 for the likelihood to activate thought control to
stop distractive thoughts, and n = 91 for the effort to stop
distractive thoughts).
Procedure
Our study consisted of three parts. First, workers filled out a
general online questionnaire 1 week prior to their laboratory
appointment. Second, after signing a consent form, workers
were asked to perform the TNT task in the lab (for more
details, see below). After the end of the TNT task, workers
were informed about the content, procedure, and technical
aspects of the experience sampling study. They were instructed to
respond to the three questionnaires per day on five consecutive
working days in a typical working week on a smartphone app
immediately after noticing the signals sent by the app. To
schedule the measurement points, participants were asked to
provide information on their typical work week, working hours,
and lunch breaks. Lastly, they filled out a practice questionnaire
on their smartphone. During the experience sampling, the
application sent short beeps or vibrations three times a day.
The signals were sent randomly during participants’ individual
working hours, but not during their lunch break, and with a
minimum time lag of 80 min. Workers had up to 10 min to
start their response. After completing the experience sampling,
workers were debriefed.
Measures
In the general questionnaire, we assessed demographic variables
(gender, age, educational level, working hours, industry) and
psychological health (depression, anxiety). In the laboratory,
the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts was assessed with
the TNT task. In the experience sampling part, we measured
momentary time pressure, momentary task complexity, the
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outcome variables activation of thought control, and effort to stop
distractive thoughts.
Ability to Suppress Unwanted Thoughts
The ability to suppress unwanted thoughts has been extensively
studied in the laboratory with the think/no-think task (Anderson
and Green, 2001). In this task, individuals are trained to
suppress target words (“no-think”) that are associated with
words they had previously learned. A typical result pattern is
that individuals recall fewer suppressed words than controls
for which no suppression instructions had been received and
even fewer suppressed words than words they are instructed to
remember (“think”).
In the current study, we used 58 weakly related, neutrally
valenced word pairs from a standardized German database
(Melinger and Weber, 2016). Ten word pairs were included as
fillers and for training purposes; the remaining 48 were divided
into three groups and rotated across experimental conditions
(baseline, think, no-think) and across subjects (counterbalancing
groups A–C). All word pairs comprised exclusively nouns, with
the left noun always the cue and the right noun always the
response word. They were presented in the center of a computer
screen on a white background using the E-Prime 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, MD, United States)
and separated from the subsequent pair by the short insertion
of a fixation cross. The TNT task is structured into four phases
(Anderson and Green, 2001). In the first phase (learning),
workers studied all 58 word pairs. Each word pair was presented
in black for 6,000 ms in random order. In the second phase
(recall), participants were asked to freely recall the response
words and say them out loud. For this, each cue was presented for
up to 4,000 ms in a pseudo-randomized order. The correct answer
was then presented for 1 s immediately following the participant’s
response, giving participants the opportunity to check whether
their answer was correct. If a worker remembered <50% of
the word pairs, we repeated the recall phase. After that, we
assessed which of the word pairs had been learned with the same
procedure (presenting time up to 3,300 ms), but did not give
feedback in order to prevent further unrecorded learning.
The third phase (think/no-think) was the main part of the
task. The cues were presented for 3,000 ms and the participants’
task varied depending on word color: Think cues appeared in
green. Here, participants were to further rehearse the related
response word in silence in order to foster the connection. No-
think cues appeared in red. Here, participants were asked to
immediately stop all thoughts about the response word and
not to think about the connections they had made during
the learning and recall phases. They were further instructed
to only focus on the presented no-think cue and to block
out any related thoughts without distracting themselves (direct
suppression instructions). During the subsequent actual think/no-
think phase, each of the 16 think and 16 no-think cues was
presented 12 times. The presentation order was determined
randomly. To counteract computer eyestrain and tiredness, we
incorporated three short breaks (45 s).
In the last phase (recall), workers were shown all cue words
(baseline, think, no-think) again in a pseudo-randomized order.
The words were presented in black for up to 3,300 ms, and
participants were asked to recall the associated response word out
loud irrespective of the instructions in the think/no-think phase.
The difference in recall rates between the baseline condition and
the no-think condition was used as an indicator of individuals’
ability to suppress unwanted thoughts. The higher a person’s
score on this indicator, the higher their ability to suppress
memory retrieval.
Distractive Thoughts
A questionnaire in the experience sampling began by asking
whether the workers had had any disruptive or distracting
thoughts during the past 30 min (distractive thoughts, “Did you
have to think of something that disrupted and distracted you at
work in the last 30 min?;” “no” coded as 0 and “yes” coded as 1).
Activation of Thought Control
If the participants experienced an distractive thought, they were
also asked whether they had activated thought control to stop
distracting thoughts (activation of thought control, “Did you
say something to yourself like ‘I do not want to think about
this anymore’ or ‘I want to forget that’?;” “no” coded as 0 and
“yes” coded as 1).
Effort to Stop Distractive Thoughts
If workers reported such an attempt, we further asked about their
effort to stop distractive thoughts (“How much did you try to
suppress the distracting thoughts?”). Participants answered on a
5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
Time Pressure
After the questions about distractive thoughts, and subsequent
actions, we asked about time pressure with a single item (“I have
had little time to do my job in the last 30 min;” adapted from
Spector and Jex, 1998). Responses ranged on a 5-point scale
(1 = not at all to 5 = extremely).
Task Complexity
In addition, we assessed task complexity with a single item (“The
task I have been working on for the past 30 min is complex;”
adapted from Maynard and Hakel, 1997). Participants answered
on a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5
(extremely).
As control variables, we assessed strength of distraction by
asking “How much did you feel distracted by these thoughts?”
(5-point scale 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely). In addition,
we measured depression with 20 items of the Beck Depression
Inventory (Schmitt et al., 2006; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90),
and anxiety with the five-item short-scale STAI-SKD (Englert
et al., 2011; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). Studies have shown that
depressed or anxious persons had a lower ability to suppress
unwanted thoughts, which can be explained by downsized
brain activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Anderson
et al., 2004; Benoit and Anderson, 2012). This area is usually
needed and activated during inhibition processes. In addition, we
assumed that these persons should be less motivated to engage in
thought control when they experienced distraction.
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RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Before testing the hypotheses, preliminary analyses with respect
to the measurement of the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts,
and the measures of the experience sampling part of the
study were conducted.
Ability to Suppress Unwanted Thoughts
To assess a score for the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts,
first, the performance data for the TNT task had to be analyzed.
We used a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
response condition (baseline, think, no-think) as the within-
person factor and counterbalancing condition (A–C) as the
between-person factor. As recommended by Anderson (2004);
see also Levy and Anderson, 2012; Streb et al., 2016), we
z-normalized all values within the participants’ counterbalancing
group to make sure our results were not based on differences
in memorability between different sets of word pairs. The final
test data for the TNT task revealed that recall rates in the three
conditions (no-think, think, baseline) differed significantly from
one another [F(2,155) = 60.58, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.28].
Contrast comparisons showed a significant suppression-induced
forgetting effect: no-think items (M = 0.84, SD = 0.19) were
more poorly recalled than baseline items [M = 0.94, SD = 0.08;
F(1) = 45.51, p < 0.001, η = 0.23], indicating that participants
successfully suppressed memory retrieval. In addition, the recall
rates of the no-think items and baseline items were lower than
the recall rates of the think items [M = 0.97, SD = 0.07; no-
think: F(1) = 90.51, p < 0.001, η = 0.37; baseline: F(1) = 18.40,
p < 0.001, η = 0.11]. There were no differences between the
three item counterbalancing groups, F(2,155) = 0.05, p = 0.955,
partial η2 = 0.00, which indicates that the lower recall rates for the
no-think items are not influenced by specific word combinations.
Then, we computed the difference in recall rates between the
baseline condition and the no-think condition as an indicator of
individuals’ ability to suppress unwanted thoughts.
Experience Sampling
One hundred fifty-eight participants responded to an average of
9.91 out of 15 surveys (range = 2–15). In total, they completed
1,565 out of 2,370 surveys, leading to a response rate to the
signals of 66%. Distractive thoughts were reported in 35.97% of
all surveys and thought control activities to stop these thoughts
in 14.19% of all surveys (39.43% of distractive thought episodes).
Participants reported having distractive thoughts enter their
mind in 563 surveys (143 participants) and reported thought
control activities to stop the distractive thoughts in 222 surveys
(91 participants). Table 1 shows means, standard deviations, and
intercorrelations between the study variables at level 2 (person
level), while Table 2 provides the same information at level 1
(experience sampling level).
We used the R software1 and the lme4 package (Bates et al.,
2015) to conduct multilevel analyses. Level 1 variables from
the experience sampling study were centered around the person
mean in order to consider situational fluctuations, whereas level
2 variables were grand-mean centered. Between-level variance
was analyzed by calculating intraclass coefficients (ICC1) for all
outcome variables. We accounted for the nesting of observations
in persons and also allowed for random slopes in all level 1
variables [strength of distractive thoughts, time pressure (linear
and squared), task complexity (linear and squared)]. Following
the recommendations of Bates et al. (2018), we specified the
random effects structure with the diagonal matrix.
The ICC1 values were 0.24 for activation of thought control,
0.24 for effort to stop distractive thoughts, and 0.13 for distractive
thoughts. Thus, there was sufficient level 1 variance in the
outcome variables to justify multilevel modeling. Furthermore,
we checked the mode assumptions for the generalized linear
and linear mixed effects models using graphic residual plots
as recommended in the literature (Bolker et al., 2009).
Results revealed no problematic deviations from normality
in the residuals.
1http://r-project.org
TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations, and correlations for level 2 (person-level) variables.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Person-level variables
1. Suppression ability1 0.00 0.99
2. Age1 36.56 12.27 −0.19*
3. Education level1 5.35 1.73 −0.01 −0.21**
4. Depression1 2.18 0.70 −0.02 0.04 −0.05
5. Anxiety1 1.91 0.56 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.63**
Experience sampling variables
(aggregated on the person level)
6. Time pressure1 2.27 0.68 0.12 −0.07 0.08 0.00 0.01
7. Task complexity1 3.01 0.65 0.01 0.09 −0.02 −0.17* −0.20* 0.34**
8. Distractive thoughts1 0.37 0.23 0.08 −0.18* −0.02 0.37** 0.26** 0.29** 0.07
9. Strength of distractive thoughts2 2.77 0.73 0.00 −0.01 0.05 0.30** 0.33** 0.11 0.03 –
10. Stopping distractive thoughts2 0.36 0.35 0.08 −0.10 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.17* 0.19* – 0.21*
11. Effort to stop distractive thoughts3 3.12 0.68 0.01 0.16 −0.11 0.01 −0.05 −0.05 0.35** – 0.07 –
1n = 158. 2n = 143. 3n = 91. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
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TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations, and correlations for level 1 (experience
sampling) variables.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
Experience sampling variables
1. Time pressure1 2.26 1.09
2. Task complexity1 3.00 1.04 0.13**
3. Distractive thoughts1 0.36 0.48 0.20** −0.01
4. Strength of distractive thoughts2 2.90 1.01 0.21** 0.03 –
5. Stopping distractive thoughts2 0.39 0.49 0.04 0.10* – 0.16**
6. Effort to stop distractive thoughts3 3.15 0.80 0.01 0.17* – 0.16* –
1n = 1,565. 2n = 563. 3n = 222. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
Hypotheses Testing
Logistic multilevel modeling conducted with data from 158
participants [n(level 1) = 1,565) revealed that the frequency of
reporting distractive thoughts [γ = 0.42, odds ratio (OR) = 1.53,
z = 4.46, p < 0.001] increased with increasing time pressure.
Table 3 shows the results of the final logistic multilevel
model testing the relationship between challenge demands (time
pressure, task complexity) and the outcome variable activation
of thought control. For reasons of clarity, we included both
time pressure and task complexity in our models. Calculating
separately lead to the same results. The model includes
only occasions in which individuals reported experiencing a
distractive thought [n(level 1) = 563, n(level2) = 143]. In all
subsequent multilevel analyses, we held the strength of distractive
thoughts constant by including it as control variable. Additionally
controlling for age, educational level, depression, and anxiety did
not change the results. Contrary to Hypotheses 1a,b and 2a, b, the
results showed no significant curvilinear relationships between
either challenge demand and the dependent variable thought
control activities to stop the distractive thoughts (time pressure:
γ = −0.19, OR = 0.83, z = −1.80, p = 0.071; task complexity:
γ = 0.03, OR = 1.03, z = 0.21, p = 0.837). However, we found
that thought control activities were more likely with linearly
increasing task complexity (γ = 0.32, OR = 1.38, z = 2.11,
p = 0.035). In addition, the strength of the distractive thoughts
predicted the likelihood of a person trying to stop them (thought
control activities, γ = 0.44, OR = 1.55, z = 3.06, p = 0.002).
We also found that the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
(dispositional factor) made it more likely that workers activated
thought control to stop the distractive thoughts, supporting
Hypothesis 3a. There was no relationship between the ability
(dispositional factor) and the dependent variable effort to stop
distractive thoughts (Hypothesis 3b).
Next, the data revealed that the ability to suppress unwanted
thoughts moderated the curvilinear relationship between time
pressure and activation of thought control (γ =−0.32, OR = 0.73,
z = −2.08, p = 0.038), as expected in Hypothesis 4a, but
not the relationship between task complexity and activation
of thought control (γ = −0.17, OR = 0.85, z = −1.15,
p = 0.251), not supporting Hypothesis 5a. We generated a
plot of the interaction at high levels (1 SD above zero) and
low levels (1 SD below the zero) of the ability to suppress
unwanted thoughts (see Figure 2). Figure 2 shows that high-
ability persons became more likely to activate thought control
to stop distractive thoughts with increasing time pressure
up to a certain point. However, the relationship turned
negative when time pressures increased further. Individuals
with a lower ability to suppress unwanted thoughts were
more likely to activate thought control when time pressure
was below average.
We also proposed a curvilinear relationship between challenge
demands and the conscious effort needed to stop distractive
thoughts that enter the mind (see Table 3). It is important
to note that this model includes only occasions in which
TABLE 3 | Predictors of the intention to stop distractive thoughts and the effort needed to stop them.
Stopping distractive thoughts1 Effort needed to stop distractive thoughts2
Predictor b 95% CI z bcs b 95% CI t bcs
Constant −0.51 [−0.89, −0.13] −2.64** −0.51 3.08 [2.91, 3.24] 37.32** –
Strength of distractive thoughts 0.44 [0.16, 0.72] 3.06** 0.34 0.10 [−0.06, 0.27] 1.28 0.10
Suppression ability 0.53 [0.10, 0.96] 2.40* 0.53 0.10 [−0.08, 0.29] 1.14 0.13
Time pressure −0.08 [−0.35; 0.19] −0.57 −0.07 0.02 [−0.11, 0.15] 0.32 0.02
Task complexity 0.32 [0.02, 0.62] 2.11* 0.27 0.03 [−0.11, 0.17] 0.45 0.03
Time pressure ∧ 2 −0.19 [−0.39, 0.02] −1.80† −0.14 0.02 [−0.10, 0.13] 0.29 0.01
Task complexity ∧ 2 0.03 [−0.25, 0.31] 0.21 0.02 0.06 [−0.05, 0.17] 1.02 0.05
Time pressure × suppression ability 0.27 [−0.05, 0.60] 1.64 0.24 0.04 [−0.12, 0.19] 0.47 0.04
Task complexity × suppression ability 0.03 [−0.26, 0.32] 0.20 0.02 −0.02 [−0.17, 0.13] −0.24 −0.02
(Time pressure ∧ 2) × suppression ability −0.32 [−0.62, −0.02] −2.08* −0.24 −0.16 [−0.30, −0.01] −2.13* −0.15
(Task complexity ∧ 2) × suppression ability −0.17 [−0.46, 0.12] −1.15 −0.12 −0.04 [−0.18, 0.09] −0.64 −0.04
Continuous level 1 variables (strength of distractive thoughts, time pressure, task complexity) were centered around the person mean; suppression ability (level 2) was
z-normalized at the grand mean. Coefficients with standardized continuous variables (bcs) were derived by additionally centering all continuous level 1 variables at the
sample mean and setting the standard deviation to 1 (cf. Hox et al., 2018). Random effects (variances), stopping distractive thoughts: strength of distractive thoughts,
0.000; time pressure, 0.000; task complexity, 0.000; time pressure ∧ 2, 0.000; task complexity ∧ 2, 0.169. Random effects (variances), effort needed to stop distractive
thoughts: Strength of distractive thoughts: 0.108; time pressure, 0.000; task complexity, 0.026; time pressure ∧ 2, 0.002; task complexity ∧ 2, 0.000. 1nLevel2 = 143,
nLevel1 = 563. 2nLevel2 = 91, nLevel1 = 222. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 (two-tailed). CI, confidence interval.
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individuals reported activation of thought control [n(level
1) = 222, n(level2) = 91]. We found no significant direct effects
(time pressure: γ = 0.02, t = 0.29, p = 0.774; task complexity:
γ = 0.06, t = 1.02, p = 0.311). The moderation between
the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts and time pressure
(γ = −0.16, t = −2.13, p = 0.039), however, reached significance,
supporting Hypothesis 4b. Figure 3 shows that individuals with
a higher ability to suppress distractive thoughts tried harder
to stop unwanted thoughts as time pressure increased but
that this relationship turned negative at higher levels of time
pressure. In contrast, individuals with a lower ability to suppress
distractive thoughts tried harder when time pressure was either
low or very high. We found no moderation of the curvilinear
relationship between task complexity and effort (γ = −0.04,
t = −0.64, p = 0.525). We found no significant interaction effect
between task complexity and the ability to suppress unwanted
thoughts predicting the effort to stop distractive thoughts. Thus,
Hypothesis 5b was not supported.
DISCUSSION
Stopping distractive thoughts can be very difficult but is
crucial for staying focused. The positive effect of self-control
activities on workers’ affective and behavioral responses in the
organizational setting is well established as it has been shown
in many studies (e.g., Lian et al., 2017). We examined person–
situation interactions to understand when workers activate
FIGURE 2 | Interaction effect of time pressure and the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts on stopping distractive thoughts (activation of thought control). Higher
and lower levels of suppression ability represent one standard deviation above and below the mean.
FIGURE 3 | Interaction effect of time pressure and the ability to suppress unwanted thoughts on the effort to stop distractive thoughts. Higher and lower levels of
suppression ability represent one standard deviation above and below the mean.
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thought control to stop distractive thoughts in daily working life,
an underresearched issue in the self-control literature. Thereby,
for being precise, we investigated and measured the ability to
inhibit unwanted thoughts as one important predictor rather
than broader concepts such as self-control, which comprises
different aspects (e.g., persistence, impulse control etc.).
As expected, whether time pressure activates or hinders
thought control activities depends on individuals’ ability to
suppress intrusions. Workers who were skilled at suppressing
intrusions stopped distractive thoughts at moderate levels of time
pressure more likely, but not at very low or very high time
pressure. Likewise, we found some evidence that these workers
put less effort into suppressing distractive thoughts when time
pressure was low or high. For individuals with a lower ability
to suppress distractive thoughts, increasing time pressure was
negatively related to thought control activities. Thus, the notion
that moderate levels of challenge demands motivate self-control
might only be true for individuals who have the relevant abilities
as well as, relatedly, sufficient cognitive capacity. Likewise, well-
intentioned advice on concentration and time management from
the literature, such as “nothing sharpens the attention better than
demanding work and the sprint toward a deadline,” do nothing
to support individuals who have difficulty stopping irrelevant
thoughts when trying to stay focused at work.
Several potential mechanisms may explain the interaction
between time pressure and the ability to suppress unwanted
thoughts. In line with activation theory (Gardner, 1986;
Gardner and Cummings, 1988), workers who were skilled in
suppressing unwanted thoughts engaged in less thought control
at very high levels of time pressure. One explanation might
be that task performance under high time pressure consumes
all processing resources that would otherwise be directed to
suppression (e.g., Román et al., 2009; Ortega et al., 2012).
For example, if a journalist has to finish an article under
high time pressure to a certain deadline, he or she has to
concentrate completely on the writing process. There is then
no capacity left to consciously banish from memory disturbing
thoughts such as “I have another article to finish today.”
Alternatively, one could suggest that at very high levels of time
pressure, workers just switch their strategy in order to cope
with the overtaxing memory load: To stay with the example,
the journalist devotes then his or her full concentration to
the current task in order to keep distracting thoughts at bay.
By doing so, he or she did not have to intentionally inhibit
unwanted thoughts (for similar findings, see Noreen and de
Fockert, 2017). A third mechanism might be that individuals
deliberately weigh the benefits of stopping distractive thoughts
(e.g., better performance) against its resource costs (mental
exhaustion; Kool et al., 2017). Under high time pressure, when
it becomes increasingly effortful to stop distractive thoughts,
the costs might outweigh the benefits, leading individuals to
change deliberately their self control strategy for coping with
these high demands.
At very low levels of time pressure, high ability individuals’
activation levels were too low for them to engage in thought
control. Alternatively, individuals might have sufficient cognitive
capacity to engage in task performance, meaning that distractive
thoughts do not distract from the task at hand or are a welcomed
interruption to make the task less monotonous or boring.
Moreover, as we only studied deliberate thought control that
raised sufficient awareness to justify reporting, it might also be
possible that these workers dealt with the distractive thoughts so
quickly that they were less aware of them.
Also in line with the predictions of activation theory and
resource models is that thought control activities already became
compromised at lower levels of time pressure for workers who
were less able to suppress unwanted thoughts. These workers are
only activated to stop distractive thoughts and to put effort into
this cognitive activity at very low levels of time pressure.
Despite these interaction effects, the data revealed also direct
relationships. As one would expect, the strength of distractive
thoughts made thought control activities more likely. In addition,
workers with a higher ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
engaged more often in thought control. It is also important to
note that task complexity was positively related to the thought
control activities to stop distractive thoughts, but we found
no significant interaction effects with the ability to suppress
unwanted thoughts.
In sum, our findings contribute to theory and research on
self-control in at least two ways. First, the study showed that
moderate levels of challenge demands such as time pressure
activate workers’ thought control even if time pressure possibly
causes also cognitive costs such as heightened information
processing. Thus, it seems that not every competing activity
that relies on executive control capacity is compellingly
detrimental to the activation of thought control. Second, it
depends on individuals’ ability to suppress unwanted thoughts
to what extent individuals are activated by challenging demands
to engage in thought control to stop distractive thoughts.
Therefore, the activation of these self-control activities depend
on both situational factors as well as on personal factors. In
the present study, workers with a lower ability to control
unwanted thoughts had difficulties to engage in thought
control activities even at low time pressure. Thus, to stay
concentrated to the task at hand, these workers should be
supported by trainings to enhance their self-control skills,
which can protect against the adverse effects of challenging
situational demands. There is already evidence that practicing
inhibitory control helps to manage intrusive experiences (e.g.,
Hulbert and Anderson, 2018; for meta-analytic evidence, see
Friese et al., 2017). Thereby, in a typical training session,
individuals are asked to repeatedly control dominant responses
by, for instance, performing the Stroop task or completing
everyday activities with the non-dominant hand (using the
computer mouse).
Interventions that aim to structure workers’ tasks by providing
intelligent assistance systems for hiding irrelevant digital
information on the computer screen might particularly help these
workers focus on their current goals when facing time pressure.
For example, the assistive system hides folders and files that are
associated with competing project that is not in focus at the
moment (Siebers et al., 2017). Support might be also provided by
time management tools or by allowing employees to accomplish
tasks in a quiet and undisturbed work environment.
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LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Despite combining a laboratory task, which measures the ability
to inhibit unwanted thoughts, and an experience sampling
study, we have to acknowledge several limitations. First, in
the experience sampling study, workers reported their thought
control activities, which was the focus of the present study. It
remains open whether these activities were successful, which
would have been an additional interesting information. However,
measuring success of stopping distractive thoughts was not
feasible with the study’s design. In the experience sampling study,
repeatedly asking whether a person has really forgotten a certain
memory content might threaten validity and probably provoke an
opposite effect after the first question, namely, that the memory
contents are even better remembered. In addition, one could
argue that the participants faked their responses in the TNT
task to be a “good participant.” However, previous research has
shown that the effects of retrieval suppression (forgetting) are
not due to the intentional withholding of to-be-forgotten items.
For example, Macrae and MacLeod (1999) demonstrated that a
monetary incentive for the recall of to-be-forgotten items did
not increase the recall rates of these items (see also Anderson
and Green, 2001). Second, we did not assess the potentially
mediating processes between challenge demands, the ability to
suppress unwanted thoughts, and the outcome variables. To
explain our results, we relied on different mechanisms such
as activation, resource allocation, and cost–benefit decisions,
which should be further explored in future studies. Third, our
concurrent measurement of predictor (challenge demands) and
outcome (thought control activity and effort) variables in the
experience sampling study limits the causal interpretation of
the data. We cannot completely rule out that the experience of
distractive thoughts biased the assessment of challenge demands
such as time pressure and task complexity. However, correlations
among these predictor and outcome variables were rather low.
Moreover, our main hypotheses focused on interactive effects
and curvilinear effects, which make it difficult to determine how
the experience of distractive thoughts should have biased the
curvilinear effects. Finally, with respect to common method bias,
interactions are generally less affected (Evans, 1985; Siemsen
et al., 2010).
CONCLUSION
Our findings highlight the importance of examining factors
that motivate or hinder workers from engaging in thought
control activities to stop distracting thoughts in daily working
life. Challenge demands are important to activate workers’
thought control strategies such as stopping distractive thoughts,
but can become detrimental quite fast when individuals
do not have the appropriate cognitive abilities. The study
underlines the importance to examine person–situation
interactions to understand how workers stay focused in modern
work environments.
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